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from spurious influences. This article gives an intuitive in-
troduction to randomization and examines some intended
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κληρω νυν πεπαλασθε διαµπερες oς κε λαχησιν :
Let the lot be shaken for all of you,
and see who is chosen. Iliad, VII, 171.
י®פְר£ד! Mעְַצּומִי Nּובֵי הַּגֹור´ל י®ׁש ּבִית Mמִדי³נ¢י
Casting the dice puts judgment quarrels to rest and keeps
distinct essential powers duly separated. Proverbs 18:18.
1 Introduction
Francisco Antonio Dória has had a consistent interest in randomness
and chaos and, together with his collaborators, has investigated fun-
damental aspects of such phenomena. This article is our contribution
to the Festschrift celebrating Doria’s 75th birthday.
This article analyses some pragmatical aspects of applying ran-
domization in empirical science and law, considers some philosoph-
ical implications or premises justifying or motivating these appli-
cations, and offers some tools that promote good randomization
practices. The Cardsharps (1594) marks the beginning of the in-
dependent career of the great Italian master Michelangelo Merisi
da Caravaggio (1571-1610). This painting displays a wealthy but
innocent looking boy playing cards with his opponent, a cardsharp,
that cheats in two ways: On the one hand, the cardsharp hides in
his belt spurious cards that he intends to use in illegitimate ways;
on the other hand, a sinister looking and strategically positioned
accomplice gives him access to privileged and undue information. Fi-
nally, the cardsharp carries a dagger, hinting at the dangers lurking
in this environment of misrepresentation and deception.
Caravaggio gives a beautiful depiction of some themes discussed
in this article. First, the social importance of activities involving
randomization, that is, the random setting of some variable of inter-
est, like the drawing of dice or, in this painting, the distribution of
playing cards. Second, it suggests the question – Why to randomize?
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Figure 1: The Cardsharps (1594), by Michelangelo Caravaggio
that is – Why should a rational agent abdicate the opportunity of
making a deterministic choice introducing, on purpose, a random
component in making a decision? If so – What is the role played
by randomization? Finally – How to randomize? that is – What
dangers could jeopardize a randomization process? and, if necessary
– How to shield or immunize the process against these dangers?
In order to answer these questions, we have to pay attention to
some topics in Statistics, Computer Science and Cryptography; in
addition, we have to examine some details concerning the design
of empirical trials or the operation of legal systems. In this article,
we investigate each one of the questions just raised, looking for an
intuitive understanding of the role(s) played by randomization.
In the final sections of the paper, we present an easy to use,
open-code, traceable, auditable, secure, and statistically sound
randomization toll that is ready for use in empirical trials and legal
applications. This kind of secure randomization tool can prevent
the possibility of misrepresentation and deception, as depicted in
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the painting by Caravaggio. Moreover, even in situations where no
misdeeds actually occur, the use of such a tool can be beneficial by
fostering public confidence in the soundness of important decisions,
by strengthening the resilience of public institutions, and by favoring
the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
2 Social Importance of Randomization
Gambling and lotteries exchange billions of Dollars every day world-
wide. Hence, ensuring honesty and transparency in these activities
should already be considered a meritory task. However, since ancient
times, sortition (i.e., selection by lottery) is used for many other
purposes. In the Iliad, one of the oldest texts of western culture
(aprox. 1200BC), the Argonauts (crew of the ship Argo) selected
a man to execute a dangerous task by sortition – see this paper’s
first opening quotation. In the same manner, modern societies often
resort to sortition for drafting. Figure 2 displays some photographs
related to compulsory enlistment for service in the USA, namely,
military drafting during the Civil (left) and the Vietnam (center)
wars, and selection for jury duty (right).
In order to gain public trust, the sortitions for the Vietnam
war were conducted in public view: Balls with calendar dates were
placed in a transparent urn and some anniversary dates were then
picked, giving the (un)lucky winners the opportunity to serve their
country in the battlefield. A post hoc statistical analysis of these
drawings revealed a significant bias favoring latter days of the
calendar, corresponding to the last balls placed inside the urn, an
unexpected effect of an ill-conceived randomization process that
generated misunderstanding, frustration and conflict.
Figure 2 (right) shows a letter calling a citizen for jury duty in
the USA. In this process, an eligible citizen was chosen at random
by running a computer program. Post hoc analyses of this random-
ization process revealed no significant bias or any other statistical
anomaly. Nevertheless, the code of these computer programs were
never made public, making the randomization process opaque and
382
Figure 2: Draft lotteries in war and peace
non-verifiable, thus generating mistrust and resentment.
Finally, in the world of science, good clinical trials are conducted
by (double) blind and random attribution of patients to two or more
distinct treatments. The objective of such a trial is to find out if a
new or alternative treatment is significantly better than the old or
standard one, according to well-established statistical criteria. In
this situation, some frequently asked questions are: Why should a
patient’s treatment be selected at random? Why not give him or
her the freedom to chose his or her proffered treatment? Why hide
from a patient information about his or her own treatment?
3 Why to Randomize?
Imagine a clinical trial where patients are free to choose a treatment
according to their own will. Among patients, there will be rich
and poor, people with different degrees of instruction, people with
better or worst networks for support, etc. Obviously, rich, well
educated, and well connected patients will have better access to good
information and advice and, therefore, will be prone to make better
decisions. Moreover, these same patients likely have better overall
living conditions and, therefore, even with the same treatment,
might have a better chance of recovery. Hence, this freedom of
choice would automatically introduce confounding effects: After
the trial is over, we would not be able to (completely) discern the
beneficial and adverse consequences of distinct treatments from
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consequences of preexisting conditions.
Similar unwanted interference is generated by the placebo and
nocebo confounding effects. If a patient knows to be receiving
either a new, experimental and possibly wonderful drug, or else
an old and possibly not very effective drug, his or her moral may
be, respectively, lifted or depressed. That, in turn, may affect
his or her overall health and chance of recovery. This is why, in
a good clinical trial, treatment information is denied (blinding or
censorship) to patients, and commonly also to their direct caretakers
(double-blinding).
There are in the medical literature plenty of examples of clin-
ical trials that came to wrong conclusions in consequence of such
confounding effects. The best known antidotes against these con-
founding effects rely in some form of randomization. The idea is
to chose a patient’s treatment based on a random variable that is
independent of any potentially confounding variable. In so doing,
the random element in the choice of treatment has the effect of
breaking causal links that should not interfere with the experiment,
allowing the trial to adequately focus on the causal links of interest
– see Stern (2008) and Pearl (2009) for further details.
Finally, let us consider the use of randomization in the legal
system, like the selection of jurors or judge(s) for a given case.
Figure 3 displays two pictures from ancient Egypt. On the left,
a stone carving of approx. 2400BC shows two merchants using
a two-pan balance to correctly measure amounts of goods for a
fair commercial transaction. On the right, the Hunefer papyrus,
of approx. 1275BC, shows the scale used by Maat, the goddess of
justice, where the heart and the (de)merits of a man are measured.
It should be clear that these two scales are essentially distinct –
they belong to distinct contexts. The figure at the center suggests
the possibility of “mixing” these two essences: Perhaps Maat could
make a more benevolent assessment in the scale of justice if she,
or her priests, received goods of commercial valuable... There we
have, once more, a confounding effect, characterized by spurious
influences between powers belonging to essentially distinct systems:
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Figure 3: Essentially different powers: Economy and Justice
in this case, the economic system and the justice system.
How to avoid such confounding effects caused by spurious influ-
ences, fostering autonomous decisions in a strong and independent
justice system? Surprisingly, the Hebrew bible already offers very
good advice at this respect, as stated in the second opening quota-
tion of this paper. Interestingly, the Hebrew root !Mעצ, etzem, whose
literal meaning is bone, also generates words meaning essence (the
etymological origin of the English word), strength, power and the
modern Hebrew word for independence.
Judges, even if perfectly honest, do not come to court as a blank
slate, nor should they. Every judge has his or her own history of
decisions and opinions. Hence, if the selection of judges could be
influenced by the litigants or other interested parties, the richer,
better informed, well connected, or otherwise more powerful parties
would likely have an advantage in directing the case to a judge
sympathetic to their arguments. For this reason, in many modern
democracies, the distribution of a new judicial case must take the
form of a random choice among the available judges or courts
qualified to judge it.
4 How to Randomize?
Previous sections discussed several applications of randomization
and explanations of why to use it. This section describes some
desirable characteristics of such a randomization process, including:
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Statistical honesty: In a set of sortitions (random selections) in
the system, the probability of any group of outcomes should
be exactly as prescribed by the established rules.
Cryptographic security: The outcome of the sortition should be
unpredictable; moreover, no external agent should be able to
influence the randomization process, even if the agent knows
in detail the randomization mechanism being used and has
state of the art knowledge of all relevant technologies involved.
Transparency: All relevant information about the sortition process
must be of public knowledge, including any pertinent detail
about the randomization mechanisms being used.
Auditability: All relevant occurrences of an actual randomization
process must be traceable and auditable. Furthermore, it
should not be possible to conceal any improper use of the
randomization system.
The first two requirements are of technical nature, stipulating
that, in the randomization process, we should use “honest dice that
cannot be tampered with” – or else a more convenient device, like
a computational algorithm that adequately mimics all the relevant
characteristics of “honest dice”. For more technical discussions on
theses characteristics, see Marcondes et al (2019), Saa and Stern
(2019) and Silva et al. (2020).
In order to emphasize the importance of the last two require-
ments, let us discuss a form of cheating known as rerandomization.
In this kind of cheating, the agent responsible for a sortition has
the privilege of using the randomization mechanism out of public
scrutiny, examine the outcome, and chose at will either to make
this process and its outcome public, or to hide this first try and
randomize a second time, as if the first try never happened. Imagine
for example the classic process of picking a ball from a transparent
urn. However, instead of making a live presentation, the sortition
ceremony is recorded for broadcasting at a later time. A dishonest
agent could repeat and record the process twice, and only release
386
the recording that best fits his or her goals, as if it were the only
recording ever made. It should be clear that the repeated use of this
subterfuge gives the agent in charge some latitude to pick and choose,
biasing the final outcome according to his or her convenience.
Authority, Transparency and Understanding
Why is transparency even required in a randomization process?
Would it no be possible, or even easier, to anchor the credibility
of the process on a principle of authority? If a given authority is
responsible for a randomization process, doesn’t the requirement of
transparency imply an implicit doubt? If so, doesn’t the requirement
of transparency imply disrespect for the same authority?
These are basic questions in philosophy of law, that can only be
answered in a context that specifies the fundamental values and goals
chosen by a given society. Niklas Luhmann (1985, 1989), a celebrated
scholar in philosophy of law, postulates that the fundamental goal
of the justice system is – “the congruent generalization of normative
expectations”. That is, the final objective of the legal system is
the construction of a harmonious society, where citizens have a
coherent view of what constitutes a good set of rules for social
behavior (normative expectations). Moreover, a legal system should
provide mechanisms that stimulate citizens to conform to normative
expectations and inhibit their transgression.
This conception of law requires from every citizen a well founded
trust that the justice system is efficient and fair, preferably obtained
by conscious understanding of laws and regulations and their forms
of implementation. Moreover, a justice system conceived according
to such principles is weak or fragile if sustained on blind faith on ad
hoc authority, but strong and resilient if sustained by a conscious,
engaged, and participative community. The articles of Silva et al.
(2020) and Stern (2018) expand these ideas.
387
Figure 4: Modulo 12 or Clock Arithmetic
5 Modular Arithmetic and Trusted
Roulettes
In this section we discuss intuitive ideas for how to implement an
honest randomization device that all interested parties can trust.
In following sections of this article we offer a viable technological
solution to the problem of randomization that satisfies all require-
ments stipulated in previous sections, following the general ideas
hereby discussed.
Modular arithmetic is an integer arithmetic system in which
numbers “wrap around” after reaching a maximum value, m, called
the modulus. A familiar example is the standard reading of a clock.
After noon (12 o’clock), we restart counting from 1, 2, ... (p.m.).
Notice that, in Figure 5, the position corresponding to noon (or
midnight) is marked either by the modulus value, m = 12, or by the
value zero – that is mathematically more convenient. In general, for
positive integers, n and m > 1, we define n modm (read n modulo
m) as the remainder of the division of n by m. For example, see
Figure 5 (left): 13 mod 12 = 1, 14 mod 12 = 2, ... 23 mod 12 = 11,
and 24 mod 12 = 12 mod 12 = 0. Figure 5 (right) illustrates the
modular arithmetic operation (9 + 4) mod 12 = 1.
Now imagine we have a game using a roulette or wheel of fortune,
see Figure 5, with k participants, also known as the stakeholders,
all of them wanting the privilege of spinning the roulette, and not
trusting anyone else to do the job. How can we break this deadlock?
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Figure 5: Rolling Dice and Spinning Roulettes
We can solve the aforementioned impasse using the following
protocol:
1. Provide each stakeholder with a well-balanced roulette, marked
according to the numbers set {0, 1, 2 . . . (m− 1)};
2. Ask each stakeholder to spin his roulette honestly, that is, with
a not fully controlled and strong enough initial impulse so to
produce any of the possible outcomes, {0, 1, 2 . . . (m−1)}, with
the same probability, (1/m). Moreover ask each stakeholder
to use his roulette independently, that is, to do so without
sharing any information with other stakeholders or interested
parties;
3. Collect and add, using modulo m arithmetic, the results pro-
duced by each one of the k stakeholders in order to produce
the final result: nf = (n1 + n2, . . .+ nk) modm.
We can guarantee that the final result, nf , produced by this
protocol is equivalent to an “honest roulette”, as long as at least
one (any one) of the k stakeholders does his job as required. This
guarantee is a corollary of the following theorem: Let x and y be
independent random variables in {0, 1, 2 . . . (m− 1)}. Then, if any
one of these random variables, x or y, is uniformly distributed, so
is z = (x+ y) modm. Imagine, for example, that variable x is not
random at all, but rather a known constant, c, namely, the initial
state of the roulette. Furthermore, imagine that y is independent
389
of x and uniformly distributed in {0, 1, 2 . . . (m− 1)}. Under these
conditions, the theorem states that the final state of the roulette,
z = c + y is uniformly distributed, corresponding to the intuitive
idea that, when using a well-constructed roulette, a strong enough
impulse will produce a final outcome that “forgets” the initial state
of the roulette. For further details and formal mathematical analyses,
see Scozzafava (1993).
In many applications in statistics, clinical trials, and complex
sortitions, we need a random variable x uniformly distributed in
the interval [0, 1[ of the real line. In computational procedures, this
continuous variable can be approximated by a fraction n/m, where
m in a large integer, and n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . (m − 1)}. This fraction
can be translated to standard floating point notation, and then be
further transformed into random variables with several probability
distributions of interest in statistical modeling, see Hamersley (1964),
Ripley (1987). Such uniform or non-uniform random variables can,
in turn, be used in dynamic clinical trials, haphazard intentional
sampling, adaptive sampling procedures, and other complex appli-
cations of interest in statistical modeling and decision science, see
for example Fossaluza (2015) and Lauretto et al. (2012, 2017) and
the bibliography therein.
In the sequel, we describe a software implementing the protocol
outlined in this section, including all necessary precautions in or-
der to guarantee cryptographical security. In this software, every
stakeholder is required to input a random number n between 0
and m = 9, 999, 999. Each stakeholder has the responsibility of
producing his or hers random 7-digit decimal number in a way he
or she finds appropriate.
Random decimal digits can be easily produced, for example, by
rolling 10-faced dice, available in several shapes with the required
symmetry conditions, see Stern (2011). Figure 6 exhibits 10-faced
dice shaped as a pentagonal trapezohedron (left) and a pentagonal
antiprism (center), and also 20-faced dice shaped as an icosahedron
(right); in order to produce a random decimal digit using icosahedral
dice, the user should read only the last digit for outcomes ranging
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Figure 6: Polyhedral dice for decimal digits
from 10 to 20.
6 Intuitive Cryptology
One crucial requirement of the random drawing approach described
in Section 5 is that the the roulettes are run independently. Other-
wise, a dishonest stakeholder Si could wait until the results of all
roulettes are revealed, and then run his/her own roulette for manip-
ulating the final outcome of the drawing: for example, suppose that
the sum of the contributions from all stakeholders except Si is n = 3
for, say, m = 12; after learning this value of n, Si could force his/her
own roulette to give ni = 2, thus obtaining nf = n+ ni modm = 5
as the final (manipulated) outcome of the drawing.
To ensure this independence property, Silva et al. (2020) builds
upon the properties of hash-based bit-commitment mechanisms.
Intuitively, a hash function H is a cryptography construct analogous
to fingerprinting for humans, as illustrated in Figure 7 – we refer
the reader to Beutelspacher (1994), Bultel et al. (2017) and Fel-
lows and Koblitz (1994) for intuitive introductions on key ideas of
cryptology, an to Rogaway and Shrimpton (2004) for a concise but
formal explanation of properties of cryptographic hash functions.
Specifically, given the fingerprint for an unknown human being, it
takes a lot of computational power to look all around the world for
the owner of that fingerprint; on the other hand, given a fingerprint
and the corresponding human, it is quite easy to check whether
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or not they match, and it is hard (almost impossible) to find two
different people with the same fingerprint (even considering identical
twins).
Similarly, suppose that someone computes the hash of a number
n, i.e., a value h = H(n), which acts as a “fingerprint” for n; then, if
only h is revealed, but n is kept secret, there is no simple mechanism
for finding the value of n. Of course, one could test every possible
value of n, checking if a guess ni is such that H(ni) = h, just like
finding the owner of a fingerprint given only the fingerprint itself.
However, the computational effort for performing such brute-force
attack would be very large. Actually, in practice the cost for hash
functions would be even larger than searching for a human who owns
a fingerprint: while there are a few billions of humans in the world,
a hash function can be used in such a manner that the number of
tests would be as large as the number of atoms in the whole planet
Earth! For this purpose, it suffices to combine the value of n with a
large and unpredictable (e.g., random) mask r when computing the
hash, i.e., to make h = H(r, n). As a result, even if there are only a
few possible values of n to be tested, determining whether or not a
guess ni is correct would require testing all possible values of r too.
Therefore, it suffices to use a large-enough mask r (e.g., 256-bits)
to ensure that any attempt of determining n via brute force would
be computationally infeasible.
When both n and h are revealed, on the other hand, it is easy
to verify whether or not they match: it suffices to compute H(n)
directly, and check if the output of this computation is identical
to the provided value of h. However, like different humans should
not have the same fingerprint, it is computationally hard to find
two distinct values of n (say, n1 and n2) that have the same hash
h. Hence, once h1 = H(n1) is revealed, one can say that the person
who revealed it is “committed” to revealing n1, i.e., it would be
hard to trick someone into believing that h1 was computed from
any other input n2 6= n1.
Such properties are used by Silva et al. (2020) to build a two-












Figure 7: Hash functions and their similarity with human finger-
printing.
1. Commitment phase: first, each stakeholder Si runs a roulette
(honestly or not), getting a value ni as result. Then, Si
computes the hash of ni, denoted hi, and reveals only hi to
the other stakeholders, keeping ni itself secret. This prevents
Si from learning the roulette results from his/her peers, and
vice-versa.
2. Reveal phase: only after all hashes are received, every stake-
holder Si reveals its own ni. The outcome of the drawing is
then computed locally by Si by adding every ni together using
modular arithmetic as explained in Section 5. In this case,
even if Si is malicious and tries to delay the revelation of ni
until it learns the partial outcome of the drawing from the
values revealed by his/her peers, it would be already too late:
after revealing hi in the commitment phase, Si has no choice
but to reveal the already chosen ni, rather than some other




We developed a simple Java library for implementing the protocol
described in Silva et. al (2020), and made it available under the
MIT License at https://doi.org/10.24433/CO.6108166.v1 This
library can, thus, be freely adapted for the needs of specific ap-
plication scenario. To help in this task, we also provide a simple
proof-of-concept graphical interface for testing purposes, which is
depicted in Figure 8. More precisely, this figure shows:
(a) A simple configuration interface for drawing a number among
m = 10,000,000 candidates, i.e., from 0 to 9,999,999. The num-
ber of stakeholders participating in the drawing and additional
metadata related to it can also be defined.
(b) A snapshot of the Commitment phase, as seen by Stakeholder
S0 in a drawing involving 5 stakeholders. In this snapshot,
S0 is then free to choose a number n0 to commit, which is
combined with a random mask for better security against
brute force attacks. Meanwhile, S1, S3 and S4 have already
sent the hashes h1, h3 and h4 of their own commitments, n1,
n3 and n4, respectively; as a result, these stakeholders cannot
modify the chosen values n1, n3 and n4 anymore.
(c) A snapshot of the Reveal phase, as seen by Stakeholder S3.
The figure shows that S3 is the only one who has not yet
revealed the chosen value for n3, while all of his/her peers
have already revealed n0, n1, n2 and n4. Nevertheless, S3 can
only reveal the correct n3 (and corresponding mask), since the
revealed value must match the committed value h3.
(d) The completion of the protocol, when one of the eligible
numbers (namely, 6,932,980) is picked with uniform probability
based on all stakeholders’ contributions n0, n1, n2, n3 and n4.
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(a) Random drawing with 5 stake-
holders (S0, S1, S2, S3 and S4) and
modulus value m = 10, 000, 000.
(b) S1, S3 and S4 after com-
mitment, as seen by S0.
Value committed by S4 is
h4 = 4VtCmakPK1pBiAN4pDW7Pj . . .
(c) S0, S1, S2 and S4 in reveal phase.
Partial result as seen by S3.
(d) Drawing result: 1,610,027 +
5,871,032 + 6,029,108 + 7,664,824
+ 5,757,989 mod 10,000,000 =
6,932,980.
Figure 8: Proof-of-concept Java implementation: screenshots
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8 Final Remarks
Previous articles of this research group have explored the need of
randomization procedures in legal systems, like the random assign-
ment (distribution) of legal cases to individual judges or courts, the
sortition of jurors for a given case, etc., see Marcondes et al. (2019),
Saa and Stern (2019), Silva et al. (2020). Moreover, these papers
provide extensive discussions on how to build honest (statistically
non-biased) and cryptographically secure procedures and protocols,
on the sociological and political importance of using fully transpar-
ent and auditable procedures, and on the positive effects of using
procedures fully compliant with the aforementioned desiderata in
the constitution of strong and autonomous legal institutions.
Finally, breaking away from vicious old habits can always be
stimulated by respectful criticism, by firm encouragement, and by
making available user friendly tools that facilitate the adoption of
virtuous new habits without the imposition of additional difficulties
beyond the already heavy load of overcoming corporate inertia.
This paper provides such a tool, fully compliant with all technical
desiderata, user friendly, written in freely available and open source
code. The authors hope it will be soon put to use by Brazilian legal
institutions and, if necessary, stand ready to help in this endeavor.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by: Ripple’s University Blockchain Re-
search Initiative; CNPq (Brazilian National Council for Scien-
tific and Technological Development – grants PQ 307648/2018-4
and 301198/2017-9); and FAPESP (São Paulo Research Founda-
tion, grants CEPID-CeMEAI 2013/07375-0 and CEPID-Shell-RCGI
2014/50279-4). The authors are grateful for suggestions received
from participants of the Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Probabil-
ity Theory, held on October 10, 2019 at IEA-USP (Institute of
Advanced Studies of the University of Sap Paulo), for early con-
versations with Julio Adolfo Zucon Trecenti from ABJ (Brazilian
Jurimetrics Association), and for the mobile interface design con-
396
ceived by Giovanni A. dos Santos and Joao Paulo A. S. E. Lins. The
authors are grateful for the invitation of Jean-Yves Beziau, from
ABF (Brazilian Academy of Philosophy), and for the effort of José
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